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Accordingly, the court affirmed the water court holding that the BLM maintained valid appropriations in its reservoirs under Montana law and the BLM
owned reserved water rights for stockwatering in Pothole Lake pursuant to

PWR 107.
Justice Laurie McKinnon, dissenting.
Justice McKinnon disagreed with the majority's application of Bailey to
conclude that the BLM put water to beneficial use and completed an appropriation. Instead, the dissent argued that the majority expanded Bailey's narrow
exception that applied to public service corporations. The Bailey court determined that to require a corporation to perfect a water right upon showing of an
actual beneficial use would be impractical because corporations could not perfect a water right until a third party put water to a beneficial use. Here, the
dissent argued the majority misinterpreted that exception to include "anyone"
who "distributes" water could perfect a water right. In so doing, the dissent
raised foundational legal principles to conclude that beneficial use " is one that
inures to the benefit of the appropriator." Along that vein, the dissent contended that the ancestral free grazers inured to their benefit when their cattle
grazed and drank water, and thus completed a valid appropriation. Conversely,
the dissent further argued the BLM did not perfect a water right because it
"never owned the livestock that appropriated the water or grazed federal lands"
and thus, irrespective of reservoir construction, the BLM did not appropriate
water under Montana law.
Gia Austin
Clark Fork Coal. v. Tubbs, 380 P.3d 771 (Mont. 2016) (holding that the
Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation's ("DNRC") rule
that required groundwater developments to be physically connected was inconsistent with the plain language of the statutory "combined appropriation" exception to the exemption of certain groundwater developments from the permit
requirement).
Montana uses a comprehensive permit system for water appropriation.
Groundwater appropriations of less than thirty-five gallons per minute and ten
acre-feet per year can be exempt from the permit requirement. The law also
contains an exception to this exemption. Under the Act, groundwater appropriators must acquire a permit if the "combined appropriation" from two or
more wells or developed springs that draw from the same source exceeds thirtyfive gallons per minute and ten acre-feet per year. Over time, the DNRC promulgated rules to further define "combined appropriation." The first of these
rules ("the 1987 rule") explained that groundwater developments need neither
to "be physically connected nor have a common distribution system to be considered a 'combined appropriation." The DNRC replaced this rule in 1993
with a rule ("the 1993 rule") that instead requires a physical connection to exist
between appropriations to count as combined. Using the Act and the 1993
rule, exempt appropriations of groundwater rose by about 3,000 each year, totaling about 113,000. These appropriations consume large quantities of water.
In response, the Clark Fork Coalition (the "Coalition"), senior water users
affected by this consumption, petitioned the DNRC to declare the 1993 rule
inconsistent with the statute. After the DNRC refused, the Coalition petitioned
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the FirstJudicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County to invalidate the 1993
rule as inconsistent with the Act and to reinstate the 1987 rule. The lower court
agreed with the Coalition, reinstated the 1987 rule, and further directed the
DNRC to initiate rulemaking to develop a new rule consistent with this ruling.
While the DNRC did not appeal the decision, the Montana Well Drillers Association, the Montana Association of Realtors, and the Montana Building Industry Association (the "Well Drillers") did. On appeal, the Montana Supreme
Court considered whether the lower court erred when it invalidated the 1993
rule, reinstated the 1987 rule, and directed the DNRC to initiate a new rulemaking.
The Court broke the first question into two parts: whether the rule was inconsistent with the plain language of the statute and whether the legislature's
subsequent amendments adopted the interpretation of the 1993 rule. The
Court explained that, when deciding if a rule is inconsistent with statutory language, it must first ascertain the plain language meaning of the statute. If a statute does not have a plain language meaning, then it is ambiguous. Once the
Court deternines whether there is a plan language meaning, it will determine
whether a rule is inconsistent or in conflict with the statute. If it determines
there is an inconsistency or conflict, then the rule is invalid. The Court explained that an agency's "subsequent inconsistent rules" do not create ambiguity
in a statutory terns. Then the Court explained that statutory amendments do
not change the intent of unchanged language.
Applying these rules, the Court examined the plain language meaning of
"combined appropriation" using dictionary definitions and grammar rules.
First, it explained that "appropriation" refers to a quantity of water removed.
Second, the Court explained that because "combined" precedes "appropriation," "combined appropriation" means a combined quantity of water, not a
physically combined groundwater development. This placement does not allow
"combined" to modify anything but "appropriation." Because the term refers
to quantity, and not method of removal, the Court determined that the 1993
rule "effectively swallow[s] up the underlying exception" because it limits the
exception to structurally combined appropriations by enabling groundwater appropriators to pump beyond the statutory limit as long as they did not physically
combine their pumping systems. This contradicts the intent of the legislature
because it allows combined appropriations of a greater quantity than authorized
by statute. The Court went on to explain that the legislature's amendments,
which continually lowered the quantity allowed for exempt ground developments but left the combined appropriation language untouched, did not adopt
the 1993 rule interpretation of the term because it did not modify the combined
appropriation language. Therefore, the intent of the combined appropriation
language remained the same, consistent with the plain meaning of the original
words and unchanged by the 1993 rule's interpretation. The Court rejected
DNRC's 1993 rule.
The second question, whether the lower court erred by reinstating the 1987
rule, appeared to the Court as a question of first impression. The Court first
looked to federal Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") case law that replaced
an invalidated rule with the previous valid rule. Then it compared this approach
to the similar approach for invalidated statutes and looked through the Montana
APA for potential inconsistencies. Finding no inconsistencies, the Court
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adopted the federal approach to invalidated rules and held that lower court did
not err by reinstating the 1987 rule.
Finally, the Court considered the Well Driller's argument that the lower
court could not require the DNRC to initiate rulemaking consistent with the
order. The Court reasoned that, because courts have the authority to "pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect," the lower court could require rulemaking to be consistent with its order. However, the Court agreed that the
District Court could not compel DNRC to initiate a new rulemaking. Because
it is the DNRC's responsibility to adopt necessary rules, it is the DNRC's decision whether or not to keep the reinstated 1987 rule.
Accordingly, the Court partially affined the lower court's decision invalidating the 1993 rule.
Justice Jim Rice, dissenting.
Justice Rice dissented. He did not find the plain language of the statute
"clear on its face." He found it strange that the Court's ruling implied that the
"DNRC inexplicably misinterpreted and misapplied a clear statute for the past
23 years." Rather, he thought the Court found the significant increase in exempt
appropriations startling and acted as a legislative body to correct a perceived
policy failing.
N. RiouxJordan
Granite Cty. Bd. Of Com'rs v. McDonald, 383 P.3d 740 (Mont 2016)
(holding the Water Court did not err in its interpretation of a 1906 decree stating a reservoir owner must release not less than 1200 miner's inches of water
for senior downstream appropriators during irrigation season, while also enjoining downstream users from demanding more than the natural flow of the creek
above the dam in times of shortage).
This case came before the Supreme Court of Montana as an appeal from
a decision of the Water Court regarding the decree from a 1906 case, the interpretation of which clarified disputed water rights between Granite County ("the
County") and McDonald, a private party.
The rights under dispute in is case arose from the terms of the 1906 Decree
in Montana Water, Electric and Mining Co. v. Schuh, decided by the United
States District Court for the District of Montana. That court granted Montana
Water, Electric and Mining Company ("the Company"), the predecessor to
Granite County, water rights associated with storage of Flint Creek water in the
Georgetown Lake reservoir for the purposes of generating hydro-electric power.
McDonald, who is a successor to one of the defendants in that case, objected
to the County's water right claims, two of which arise out of the Schuh Decree.
The root of the controversy in Schuh is the Decree's seemingly conflicting
language. The Decree states that during irrigation season, the Company must
cause to flow into the channel of Flint Creek "not less than 1200 miner's inches"
of water below its electric plant, enjoining the Company from diverting water
from the creek decreed to downstream users. At the same time, the Decree
recognized downstream user's rights were limited to the natural inflow of the
creek. As a result, the Company was prohibited from releasing any amount

